A mixed-integer non-linear programming model that minimises the total regulatory costs of controlling nitrogen oxide is used to investigate how a newly proposed permit trading scheme in Taiwan, which incorporates the features of banking and a nonone-to-one trading ratio, may affect firms' emission reduction strategies and permit trading decisions. Compared to the previous regulation where only an air pollution fee is used, the new regulation that requires a reduction in emissions by 10 per cent from the emission level in the year 2000 for a 5 year period will increase the costs by 77 per cent, which is equivalent to US # 9.87 million. The design of banking and the increasing returns to scale characteristic of pollution control among firms might lead to an uneven reduction in emissions in each year. Setting a lower reservation rate for banking would, however, help maintain a more stable environmental quality without a significant loss to the government in terms of air pollution fee revenue.
Introduction
A tradable permit system has been widely used in many countries for pollution control (e.g. the Acid Rain Trading Program in the U.S. and the Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme in the European Union). Theoretically, the system can reach a given environmental target in a cost-effective way under certain assumptions such as full information and zero transaction costs (Montgomery 1972) . A series of empirical studies has also indicated that substantial cost savings could be achieved by implementing a tradable permit system (e.g. Atkinson and Lewis 1974; Maloney and Yandle 1984; Krupnik 1986; Johnson and Pekelney 1996) . Encouraged by the successful experience of the U.S. Acid Rain Trading Program, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in Taiwan has planned to establish its first permit trading program together with the current air pollution fee regulation in the Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties in Southern Taiwan, the major bases for heavy industries, to reduce nitrogen oxide (NO x Our review of the literature on location effects under permit trading reveals no literature that emphasises the trading ratio issue mentioned above and which also incorporates the possibility of banking, due to difficulties in modelling. Nor do they offer an operational framework to analyse how the discounted banked permits and the non-one-to-one trading ratio can be designed. This study proposes a conceptual and operational framework by integrating both the design of the banking system and the feature of a nonone-to-one trading ratio.
KPERMS -background
The Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties are the main areas where the electricity and gas, paper, fabric and metal, manufacturing, petroleum refining and chemical industries are concentrated. The emission of NO x from these highly polluting industries has led to serious health damage over the past 20 years. In contrast to the command and control policy adopted in the early days, an air pollution fee was introduced in 1995 to ensure that the air quality in Taiwan could reach a level comparable to that of developed nations. This unit air pollution fee is determined by geographical indicators such as wind, temperature, the amount of rainfall and the adoption or use of certain pre-approved technology. Based on an EPA report (2006) , the average annual air pollution fee collected in Taiwan is around # 6.5 million 1 and has become an important financial source for many counties. Around the time the air pollution fee was imposed, NO x emissions decreased by a significant amount (EPA 2006) ; however, due to the rapid economic growth in the past 10 years, the annual NO x emission levels have started to increase and now are around 52 000 tons (Executive Yuan 2006) . Thus, the EPA has proposed a new concept referred to as 'total emission control' that tries to control the quantity of NO x through a tradable permit system. The target of this newly proposed regulation, referred to as the Kaohsiung-Pingtung Emission Reduction Market System (KPERMS), is to reduce NO x emissions by 10 per cent in each year based on the year 2000 baseline emission levels. Thus, each firm needs to reduce its emissions by at least 10 per cent in each year in accordance with its baseline for the year 2000. When firms fail to sufficiently reduce their emissions, they have to buy permits in the market to fulfil the reduction requirements. If the newly proposed permit trading system can be implemented successfully in this area, the same regulation will be applied to other areas in Taiwan. KPERMS is not a pure permit trading scheme. Instead, it is a mixed regulatory system. That is, even though firms are allowed to trade emission rights, they still have to pay for the pollution they have emitted. However, the draft of the trading rules (EPA 2002) indicates that firms that are regulated by such a mixed system can have a preferential air pollution fee rate for at most five years. The purpose behind incorporating the current air pollution fee is to maintain the revenue for government use, but not to act as a 'trigger price' as suggested by Roberts and Spence (1976) and Pizer (2002) due to the uncertainty of compliance costs among firms. Unlike those 'emission allowance systems' such as the U.S. Acid Rain program and the ERMS, KPERMS is an emission credit system in which firms can only apply for an emission reduction credit (ERC) if the amount of reduced NO x emissions is higher than the 10 per cent reduction target. Each unit of ERC allows firms to offset 1-ton of NO x emissions. However, the amount of excess emission reduction needs to be adjusted first through an exchange coefficient which is currently set at 1.2 by the EPA as the amount of ERCs for which firms can apply. For example, if the amount of the reduced NO x emissions of a firm is 12 tons higher than the 10 per cent target, then it can only apply for 10 units of ERCs after the adjustment. The unused ERCs can be sold or banked for future use, but they can only be kept for 5 years. In addition, each banked ERC needs to be discounted by a reservation coefficient prior to future use. For example, one unit of ERC from the past year can only be used to offset 0.8 tons of NO x emissions this year under a 0.8 reservation coefficient. The banked ERCs need to be adjusted by the same rate each year. Thus, the longer the ERC has been banked, the smaller the amount of NO x that it can offset. Currently, no agreement has been reached regarding the value of the reservation rate in the KPERMS draft. For the purposes of the simulation, this study assumes a coefficient of 0.8.
Based on the hearing held by the EPA in 2002 for implementing the KPERMS in the Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties, most firms in this area expressed reservations regarding the mixed system of pollution control. This is not only because permit trading is a new concept for them, but also because the new regulation will require them to further reduce their current emission levels. Furthermore, they only recently experienced a regulatory change from command and control to the air pollution fee in 1995. If the trading system had begun to operate in 2005, this would have meant that the NO x control policy would have been dramatically changed twice in the past 10 years. Thus, the implementation of the system has been postponed on several occasions and is still uncertain. reflects the perspective of a social planner in achieving the targeted emission reduction levels in the most economical way. The objective of the model of the social planner is to minimise the total regulatory costs of all firms which consist of the emission control and the air pollution fees. Each firm can either choose to reduce its NO x emissions to comply with its emission reduction requirement and sell excess permits, or else buy the required permits from other participants in the market. The model assumes that all these decisions are controlled by the social planner who has full information regarding the individual producer's cost structure. This means implicitly that all participants cooperate both with each other and with the social planner in adopting the socially optimal solution. Clearly, this is not a true representation of reality, but the purpose here is to determine a socially optimal solution which provides a benchmark against other alternatives.
When different exchange and reservation coefficients are set to transfer emission reductions and banked permits into real ERCs that can be actually traded in the market, we need to distinguish whether or not ERCs in trading markets are generated in the current year or from previous banking. To accomplish this, we create two separate 'imaginary' markets referred to as the 'fresh' and 'banking' markets for ERC transactions. The fresh market is composed of ERCs generated from the current period, while the banking market is designed only for ERC transactions from previous years. Firms can participate in either market to meet the environmental standards.
A mathematical representation of the social planner's model is given as follows: 
for all F , Y
The notation used in the model is described below: F and Y denote the firm and the year, respectively; δ is the discount factor, while the upper script f and b associated with the variables denote whether or not the variable is in conjunction with the fresh or banking markets; X F , Y is the amount of reduced pollution by firm F in year Y using the current best available control technology (BACT); TC F ( X F , X ) is the total cost function of NO x control by firm F using BACT; t F is the unit air pollution fee paid currently by firm The objective function (1) represents the total regulatory cost of emission control to firms. The first term is the cost resulting from the emissions reduction, while the second term represents the air pollution fee paid by each firm during the planning process. Equations (2) and (3) regulate the annual emission level for each firm in the fresh and banking markets. This means that, at the end of each year, each firm must either reduce its emissions by an adequate amount or have sufficient ERCs on hand to offset the difference between the required and actual NO x reduction levels in order to satisfy the EPA's regulation. The left-hand side of Equation (2) represents the supply side of ERCs in the fresh market. The emission reduction credits come from the firms' emission reduction activities or from purchases made through market transactions. These two sources determine the possible supply of ERCs. The right-hand side of Equation (2) is the demand side for ERCs. For any firm, it includes the amount of ERCs sold, banked and used by the firm to cover the required
The Author Journal compilation © 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd emission reduction. If the total supply of ERCs is greater than or equal to the total demand for ERCs, then the overall emission standard will be met. Since the amount of the emission reduction needs to be adjusted first through an exchange coefficient before becoming an ERC, the coefficient k is used to adjust the difference between the emission reduction level and the number of ERCs.
Similar to Equation (2), Equation (3) is the emission constraint for firms in the banking market. The left-hand side of constraint (3) is the sum of ERCs bought, the banked ERCs from the previous trading season, and the banked ERCs directly from the banking market itself. In addition, regardless of whether the banked ERCs are from the previous year or the banking market itself, they need to be adjusted by a reservation coefficient r. A lower value of r implies that less unused ERCs can be carried for future use. The right-hand side of this constraint implies that those banked or bought ERCs in the banking market can be sold or used to meet the required emission reduction level set by a firm. Since firms are free to meet their emission standards in each market, Equation (4) implies that the sum of these two endogenously determined standards needs to satisfy the real government regulatory target.
In Equation (2), the amount of supplied and banked ERCs in the fresh market will only be positive when
However, when a firm has no ERC for sale or banking, it may either not be engaging in any emissions reduction (X F,Y = 0) or may only be reducing its emissions by less than the required amount (X F,Y < h F,Y b F,Y ). Since the model allows firms to freely choose the required reduction levels in each market, constraints (5)-(8) are established to avoid the situation where firms choose a lower emission standard in the fresh market and supply an amount of ERCs that is not in compliance with the KPERMS rules during the problem-solving process. To accomplish this, constraint (5) first defines the gap between the firms' actual emission reductions and the required reduction levels. When the difference
and Conversely, and Constraints (6) and (7) then restrict the value of these deviation variables to be determined by the product of a constant c and a binary variable . When the binary variable equals 1, the positive deviation variable must be positive, and the negative deviation variable must be 0. Therefore, the left-hand side of constraint (5) must be positive. This implies that firms will have ERCs for sale or banking. In other words, when is 0, is 0 and must be positive. This will lead to the left-hand side of constraint (5) being negative, and will mean that firms' actual emission reduction levels are lower than the required levels and that no ERCs can be generated. Constraint (8) then ensures that when a firm reduces its emission by more than the required amount, it can have the right quantity of ERCs for sale and banking.
Equations (9) and (10) require that firms not act as both buyers and sellers in the same trading market. The purpose in adding this constraint is that it offers more information for solving this complicated MINLP model. However, these two constraints do not rule out the possibility that a firm may play (11) represents the equilibrium constraint for the permit trading market. It requires that the total supply of permits from both markets equal the total demand. Since our model contains binary variables, the shadow price information may or may not be able to represent the equilibrium permit price. The related price issue under a discrete modelling structure will be further explored in the next section. Constraint (12) implies that a firm cannot reduce its emissions below its baseline emission level. Constraint (13) is for binary variable The last constraint (14) requires that the endogenous variables be non-negative.
Data
The data required in the social planner's model, which includes the total emissions in the year 2000 for the projected KPERMS participants, the technical description of the KPERMS sources (EPA 2001) , and the costs of add-on control technologies available to these sources (Table 1) , is provided by the EPA (Chu 1998) . The emission dataset covers 42 large firms which had emission levels of more than 30 tons of NO x in 2000.
According to the EPA's technical report (Chu 1998) , Low NO x Burner (LNB) is regarded as the BACT for the electricity-generating, petrochemical, papermaking, cement-manufacturing and fertiliser-producing industries. Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR), on the other hand, is the most cost-effective equipment for the steel-rolling, steel-and iron-casting and petroleum-refining industries. For the electricity-generating industry, LNB is often used with the 'over-fire air' (OFA) process to increase the efficiency of pollution control. Therefore, this study assumes that LNB, OFA and SCR are the only forms of add-on 3 equipment that will be used by firms. Although the potential cost-saving 
from permit trading arises due to the heterogeneity of pollution control technologies among firms, the survey in the technical report (Chu 1998) indicates that more than 98 per cent of firms in this area had already adopted LNB, OFA and SCR on some of the existing equipment following the imposition of air pollution fees in the year 1995, combined with the fact that the government had identified the NO x control equipment as BACT on several occasions and in different publications (e.g. EPA 1996 EPA , 2003 Industrial Development Bureau 2002) . This gives us reason to believe that the equipment will still be chosen by firms based on cost minimisation considerations. According to the estimated cost functions for LNB, OFA and SCR shown in Table 1 , the average abatement costs will tend to decline as more emissions are reduced. That is, firms will face increasing returns to scale (IRTS) with regard to emission controls. The unit air pollution fee paid by each firm in 2004 in the model is based on a mail survey. This is because the information is confidential for both the EPA and the firms. To increase their willingness to disclose these numbers, firms were only asked to write the average of what they paid in 2004. 4 The average unit air pollution fee obtained from the survey turned out to be #148.7 per ton, and this ranged between #77 and #310 per ton. However, there was no way to test the accuracy of the data.
Results
By applying the collected data, this study simulates the firms' emission reduction strategies in KPERMS for five years under a 6 per cent discount rate through the solver SBB, CPLEX and SNOPT offered in the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS). 5 The reason for choosing a five-year duration is to avoid the difficulty of modelling a more complicated case where the ERC might have expired. In addition, the capability of the current software for solving the MINLP problem also has its limitations. One thing that needs to be kept in mind is that constraints (9) and (10) give rise to improper convexity in the model. Even though the supplementary information from the solvers' status based on the GAMS may indicate that the model works well, computational problems may still occur when applying this model to other problems with different cost structures, baseline emission levels, trading rules or even the solvers used. In addition, since there is just one firm from each of the food, papermaking, cement-manufacturing and fertiliser-producing industries, they will be categorised under 'other' industries in the following discussion.
At the 0.8 reservation coefficient, the simulation results (Table 2 ) reveal a total regulatory cost of #9.87 million. Of this, #4.36 million is for air pollution fees, and #5.51 million is for the NO x reduction. Firms in the petrochemical and electricity-generating industries play a major role in supplying the ERCs in the market, while most firms in the petroleum-refining, steel-rolling and other industries take on the role of buyers. If, instead of implementing the proposed mixed system, the control agency decides to stick with the current air pollution fee regulation and does not require any NO x reduction, the total fee expended by firms will be #5.59 million during the five-year planning horizon. Therefore, switching from the current pure fee regulation to the new system will raise the total costs by 77 per cent.
In the first year, it is found that 3741 units of ERCs were traded; however, the amounts of the transactions went up to 4164, 6323, 6296 and 6342 from year 2 to year 5, respectively. On the other hand, the amounts of the banking from year 1 to year 5 were 7155, 3545, 1551, 203 and 0 tons, respectively. Thus, even if the reservation coefficient imposes a penalty on firms with NO x reductions and banking, the IRTS property of pollution control will still encourage some firms to reduce their emissions by more than the required amount and to bank them for future use. However, zero banking in year 5 may be due to the setting of a five-year planning horizon. The social planner under a trading program with a limited life might ask firms to only generate an 'exact' amount of ERCs for cost minimisation purposes. 6 Although the target NO x emission reduction level is initially 7262 tons (Table 2) , the setting of exchange and reservation coefficients leads to an annual average reduction level of 9056 tons. That is, NO x emissions are reduced by a further 8970 tons during the five-year planning horizon. While an over-reduction in emissions by firms might be beneficial to the environment, since some of the banked ERCs are withdrawn to offset the emissions, the actual NO x reduction in some years (such as years 2 and 3 in Table 2 ) are seen to be below the 6 One exception is when the unit air pollution fee is set at high levels. Some firms might be willing to reduce emissions more than the required amount and to let those banked ERCs expire at the end of year 5 in order to reduce their air pollution fee expenditure. This also implies that we should expect worse air quality in these years due to the way in which the bankings are designed.
The shadow price information that is discounted by 6 per cent in each year from the equilibrium constraint in the GAMS indicates that the trading prices from year 1 to year 5 are #28.2, #35.2, #44, #55 and #68.8 per ton, respectively. However, these shadow prices may or may not be interpreted as equilibrium prices due to the discontinuity of the model (Gomory and Baumol 1960) . To check whether or not these prices can accurately reflect the imputed value of the scarce resource, such as tradable permits in this study, another economic model based on firms' cost minimising behaviour under a perfectly competitive permit market is used. In this model, each firm tries to minimise its own regulatory costs while acting as a permit price taker in the market. The shadow prices derived from the social planner's model are then plugged into the model from the firms' perspective to determine if their behaviour conforms to that required by the social planner. The results of the simulation indicate that the firms behave just as the social planner wanted them to. Therefore, the shadow price reported by the GAMS solver can be interpreted as the equilibrium price, at least in this case. To determine if these prices are affected by discounting the banked ERC, the results of the sensitivity analysis conducted using different reservation coefficients are reported in Table 3 . These results indicate that the permit price is relatively stable under a zero reservation rate. When banking is discounted, the prices in general would exhibit an increasing trend from years 1 to 4. If the coefficient is set under 0.7, the price will be over 100 in year 4 and will then drop by a large amount in the last year. This is because some firms (from the petrochemical industry), which originally acted as permit buyers, are now asked by the social planner to reduce their emissions by only a smaller amount to meet a more stringent banking rule, and incur relatively higher regulatory costs under the IRTS characteristic. Thus, we can conclude that the permit prices are very sensitive to the setting of the reservation coefficient.
The results obtained from the sensitivity analysis in Table 3 also show that a reservation rate that is close to 1 will tend to encourage more banking and lower the total regulatory costs. However, it will give rise to a more uneven emission reduction pattern and higher air quality uncertainty. On the other hand, if we lower the reservation coefficient from 1 to 0.5, the total regulatory costs will only be increased by 4 per cent from #9.7 to #10.1 million. At the same time, the amount of banked ERCs will decrease by 35 per cent, while the total amount of the reduction in NO x will increase by 14 per cent due to the change. Larger emission reductions under lower reservation coefficients will also imply better environmental quality and less air pollution fee revenue. However, the results indicate that the fee revenue will only be reduced by 2 per cent. In addition, less banking is accompanied by a more evenly distributed emission control pattern during the five-year planning horizon (Table 3) . Therefore, the control agency should consider setting a lower reservation rate to maintain a more stable air quality. Based on the current KPERMS draft, we have no information on the preferential fee rate for firms in the program. Thus, we further simulate a case where various preferential air pollution fee rates are applied to the firms when the exchange and reservation coefficients are set at 1.2 and 0.8, respectively. The results (Table 4) show that even when all firms are exempted from any pollution fee (100 per cent off), the difference in terms of the total reduction in emissions in the case where firms pay the year 2004 fee rate is only 357 tons. This implies that the firms' emission reduction behaviour is not affected much by the preferential fee rate that we assumed in the study. In addition, it has almost no impact on the amount of banked ERCs and their corresponding trading volume in the market. However, the total pollution fee revenue will decline sharply by #4.36 million if the mixed system is transferred to a pure permit trading scheme. Therefore, if the control agency wishes to use the fee rate as a tool to encourage a greater reduction in emissions, it should consider differentiating the rate among firms regardless of whether it gets involved in emission control activities.
Lastly, we simulate two other scenarios for comparison purposes (Table 5 ). In Scenario 1 where both the exchange and reservation coefficients are set to 1, the results indicate that the total regulatory costs will decline to #6.21 million and will be 37 per cent lower than in the case where the exchange and reservation Table 5 ). In Scenario 2, not only is 1 used for both of these coefficients, but a pure permit trading scheme with no air pollution fee is also assumed. The total regulatory costs in this case decrease only to #1.7 million. In addition, since no firm has any desire to bank ERCs under either of these scenarios, this implies that a balanced emission reduction pattern is expected. However, the air quality will still fluctuate if ERCs are bought by firms that cause more damage as a result of their emissions. Since the total costs under this one-to-one trading ratio are much lower, the control agency should consider giving up the possible location effects at this moment in time if its major concern is to raise the firms' willingness to accept the new regulatory system.
Conclusion
Based on a social planner's perspective of minimising the total regulatory costs for NO x control, a MINLP model that mixes air pollution fees and permit trading is developed to simulate a newly proposed regulatory scheme in Taiwan. The results indicate that the firms' total costs for NO x control will be increased by 77 per cent if the regulation is switched from the current air pollution fee to the proposed mixed system, with the exchange and reservation rates being set at 1.2 and 0.8, respectively. Firms in the petrochemical and electricity-generating industries are the major ERC suppliers in the market, while firms in the other industries are the buyers. Although the annual required reduction level is only around 7262 tons, the exchange coefficient used in ERC trading leads to an average reduction level of 9056 tons within a 5 year planning period. However, if firms are allowed to carry more ERCs for future use, the IRTS characteristic of pollution control leads to uneven reduction activities in each year. The situation becomes even more severe when the reservation coefficient is set close to 1. Based on our simulation, a lower reservation coefficient would encourage more emission reduction and lead to a smooth reduction pattern without the government losing too much pollution fee revenue. In addition, the firms' total regulatory costs would only be raised by a relatively small amount under these circumstances. Due to the fact that the environmental quality could be further improved by an overreduction in NO x emissions, a lower reservation rate could be set to maintain a more stable air quality. Compared with the air pollution fee rate, the reservation coefficient used in banking plays a more important role in determining the firms' emission reduction level. Based on the current setting, a change in the fee rate will affect the tax revenue, but will have virtually no impact on the amount of the pollution reduction. Since firms in the petrochemical and electricity-generating industries maintain almost the same emission reduction levels under various air pollution fee rates, the lower fee rates will only benefit those firms that are not committed to any form of pollution control. Therefore, if the objective of the control agency is to obtain a greater reduction in emissions or to encourage firms to use a more efficient control technology, it should then try to use a more differentiated fee rate schedule to encourage the firms to reduce their emissions. For example, lower fee rates can be applied to firms with higher emission reduction levels. Although banking may offer a certain degree of flexibility in regard to controlling emissions, the results of the simulation indicate that this will lead to unstable air quality in our mixed system when a reservation coefficient close to 1 is applied to the unused ERCs at the same time as a-non-one-to-one trading base. On the other hand, setting both the exchange and reservation coefficients to 1 can effectively eliminate the firms' desire to resort to banking even under the assumption of IRTS for emission control (Scenarios 1 and 2) . However, the finding of zero banking may be due to the firms' ability to generate ERCs in our dataset. If some large polluting firms can reduce their emissions to zero at one time and supply enough permits through banking for several trading seasons, we should still expect some banking under the IRTS property. Therefore, how environmental quality or firms' emission reduction strategies might be affected by banking permits will depend on the interaction of several factors such as trading rules, the cost structure of emission controls, the firms' baseline emission levels, or whether or not an air pollution fee is also used.
Apart from the policy implications derived from the simulation, this study contributes to the existing permit trading literature by proposing an operational framework that can deal simultaneously with both the exchange rate and the banking of permits. By weighting all the intended goals such as maintaining the current air pollution fee, encouraging greater emission reductions, or achieving a more stable air quality, the control agency can easily find an appropriate combination of the parameters in the model by analysing firms' reactions to the policy changes.
